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1. Introduction 
he majority of Japanese people participate in both Shintō 神道 and Bud-
dhist occasions in the course of their lives, experiencing Shintō-Buddhist 
overlap in areas such as worship, pilgrimage, amulets and folk-religious prac-
tices and beliefs. It makes little analytical sense to regard Buddhism and Shintō 
as competing or separate religions. For this reason, some time ago I started to 
use the term Shinddhism to describe the entwined traditions. My aim was to 
help my undergraduate students understand better the nature of mainstream 
Japanese religion.  
This holistic representation of Buddhism + Shintō = Shinddhism was at 
least an advance on the view that Buddhism and Shintō are two separate relig-
ions, between which Japanese people have in some way to choose. Such a mis-
conception is perpetuated by widely-quoted statistics for separate Shintō and 
Buddhist adherence which add up to near double the Japanese population. 
However, the simple use of an English neologism such as Shinddhism is not 
sufficient to resolve two serious problems affecting a proper characterisation of 
Shintō (and Buddhism) in the context of Japanese religion. These problems are: 
a)  That the term Shintō has no agreed meaning. 
b)  That the term religion is problematic in the Japanese context, particu-
larly when used in relation to Shintō. 
These are hardly new observations, but in this paper I am not going to indulge in 
a postmodern-ish methodological lament about the inadequacy of any and all 
categories and definitions in Religious Studies. My purpose is to enquire into the 
meanings of Shintō.  
2. What is Shintō? 
A few years ago I was asked by the Curzon Press to write an introduction to 
Shintō in the form of a reference dictionary.2 I was attracted to this project for a 
number of reasons which are only worth spelling out here because I suspect that 
they may be shared by others interested in understanding the nature of religion 
in East Asia, and particularly Japan. 
                                                   
1  The initial version of this paper was presented at the XVII International Congress of the 
International Association for the History of Religions in Mexico City, 1995. 
2  Published as Brian BOCKING, A Popular Dictionary of Shintō (London: Curzon Press, 
1996). 
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Firstly, I felt that an accessible and reasonably objective Religious Studies 
account of Shintō was needed. Despite the growth of interest in Eastern religions 
generally and the explosion of interest in Japan and Japanese culture from the 
1980s onwards, English language books devoted to Shintō have been few and far 
between, especially in comparison with the steady stream of books and articles 
concerned with Buddhism (particularly Zen) and with the new religions of Ja-
pan. When in the late 1970s I started teaching in the UK about Japanese relig-
ions there were only two post-war books on Shintō in print which seemed at all 
suitable for students of religion. One was Ono Sokyōs Shintō, the Kami Way3, a 
brief and somewhat idealised presentation of Shintō which has been reprinting 
now for nearly forty years. The other was the French scholar Jean Herberts 
Shintō: At the Fountainhead of Japan4, a substantial but unwieldy work packed 
with detail but lacking any kind of critical perspective. Neither book, for exam-
ple, seriously addressed the radical transformations of Shintō following the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868 (a lacuna subsequently first filled by Helen Hardacres excel-
lent Shintō and the State, 1868-19885 to which I will return). Even now, some 
popular introductions to Shintō continue to present a naive view of Shintō, re-
flecting aspects of the ideology of pre-war Japanese nationalism such as that 
Shintō is the ancient, unchanging indigenous religion of Japan.6 
Secondly, I wanted an opportunity to clarify some problems in the under-
standing of Shintō which had remained unresolved in my own mind for too long. 
The main issue for me was simply, what is Shintō? I understood that the modern 
idea of Shintō as a national religious tradition separate from Buddhism could be 
traced to the Meiji Restoration, but it was not clear to me how pre-Meiji Shintō 
should be characterised. So much of Japanese tradition was invented, modern-
ised or refashioned beyond recognition in the Meiji period that there is good rea-
son to ask if Shintō as we know it now, existed at all before then. Associated 
with this problem were questions about Shintōs historical origins and its rela-
tionships with rather better-defined historical religious traditions such as Bud-
dhism and Confucianism on the one hand, and folk traditions of Japan and East 
Asia on the other. These are the staple concerns of contemporary Shintō Stud-
ies.7 
                                                   
3  ONO Sokyō, Shintō: The Kami Way (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle & Co., 1962). 
4  Jean HERBERT, Shintō: At the Fountainhead of Japan (London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 1967). 
5  Helen HARDACRE, Shintō and the State, 1868-1988 (hereafter Shintō and State) (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
6  Meiji 明治 ideologues successfully promulgated the view that Shintō is Japans ancient and 
unchanging indigenous religion. This idealised view seemingly continues to serve the needs 
of European orientalism. See e.g. Shintōism in the recent anthology by Ian MARKHAM, 
ed., A World Religions Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). Aimed at school and under-
graduate audiences, the volume uncritically reproduces the prewar image of Shintō. See 
also the discussion of Hirai below 
7  See for example the Introduction to John BREEN and Mark TEEUWEN, eds., Shinto in His-
tory. Ways of the Kami (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000). 
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Thirdly, I was aware that how we approach, understand and most impor-
tantly teach about Shintō is not an issue of merely academic significance. The 
political aspect of Shintō has often been ignored by Western writers on Japanese 
religion. This was so even in the pre-1940s heyday of state Shintō8 but there is a 
continuing debate inside and outside Japan about Shintōs relationship to Japa-
nese nationalism and national identity, a debate which has not only domestic but 
also international ramifications because of the global economic power wielded 
by todays Japan. Shintō is currently being promoted outside Japan by elements 
of the Shintō establishment as an environmentally-conscious tradition with a 
special regard for nature and with a universalist potential,9 rather than as a tra-
dition which is narrowly Japanese. In November 1994 a conference organised by 
the newly founded International Shintō Foundation was held at London Univer-
sity (SOAS: The School of Oriental and African Studies) on the theme of Shintō 
and Japanese Culture. The symposium began with an address by Carmen 
Blacker, the distinguished scholar of Japanese religions and folklore, who drew a 
distinction between Shintō proper, which is concerned with the holiness of na-
ture, and the aberrant nationalist Shintō of the pre-war period. Dr. Blacker ar-
gued that a renewed interest in Shintō should not be interpreted as a revival of 
ultranationalism. Now, there is no doubt that Shintō can be understood in part 
as a form of paganism or nature religion which has the potential to provide, in 
Blackers phrase the inviolable metaphor for nature lacking in much monothe-
istic Western religion. Even so, the Japanese government (LDP) has tried on at 
least five occasions in the post-war decades in the face of domestic and interna-
tional protests to secure parliamentary approval for state patronage of the Yasu-
kuni shrine in central Tokyo.10 Yasukuni Jinja 靖國神社 is probably the best-
known Shintō shrine in Japan. It forms the symbolic apex of the national net-
work of prefectural gokoku 護國 (nation-protecting) shrines for the war dead 
and was built early in the Meiji period (1868-1912) for the novel purpose of en-
shrining, by non-Buddhist rites, the spirits of soldiers killed in battle. Initially 
the intention was to memorialise the contribution of those who had fallen on the 
side of the victors in the civil wars which paved the way for the modernising 
Meiji government. Subsequently the spirits of millions of military personnel 
killed in Japans international conflicts have been enshrined and since the 1970s 
these have included a number of class A convicted war criminals from World 
War II.11 To ignore the current political dimension of Shintō by representing in-
stitutions such as the Yasukuni shrine as peripheral to Shintō would itself be a 
                                                   
8  On this issue see Michael PYE, Shintō and the Typology of Religion (hereafter Typol-
ogy), Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 1.2, (1989), 189 and the same authors 
Diversions in the Interpretation of Shintō, Religion 11.1, (1981), 61-74. 
9  The contemporary argument that Shintō has universalistic traits is considered and dis-
counted by PYE in Typology, 193. 
10  For an official introduction visit the URL http://www.yasukuni.or.jp 
11  See Klaus ANTONI, Yasukuni Jinja and Folk Religion, in Religion and Society in Modern 
Japan, ed. by Mark MULLINS, SHIMAZONO Susumu and Paul SWANSON (Berkeley: Asian 
Humanities Press, 1993) for the interesting argument that the Yasukuni shrine functions 
also to protect Japan from the potentially vengeful spirits of the war-dead. 
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political act, however well-intentioned. Any account of Shintō as a whole must 
surely address such deep contradictions. 
3. Challenging the standard view of Shintō 
An account of Shintō that is found with minor variations in many popular intro-
ductions to Japanese culture and history runs somewhat as follows. 
Shintō is an ancient tradition indigenous to Japan based on shrine-worship and 
devotion to the ubiquitous kami 神 (spirits, gods). Originally nameless, it adopted 
the name Shintō only to distinguish itself from the newly introduced Buddhism. 
The pre-eminent Shintō kami is the Sun Goddess Amaterasu天照, ancestral deity 
of the Imperial house. Shintō was strong enough to survive the influx of Buddhism 
and Chinese culture around the 6th century AD. Indeed, it was the innate Shintō 
mentality of the Japanese which throughout history has helped decide which 
elements of foreign culture and religion were appropriate to Japan and which were 
to be rejected. Despite various ups and downs, Shintō maintained a working 
relationship with Buddhism over many centuries up to the present. This was 
possible because Buddhism and Shintō functioned, with some overlap of course, in 
different areas of human life. To borrow a Japanese expression, one is born Shintō 
but dies Buddhist 12 . Shintō (according to this understanding) deals with life, 
growth, food, dance and song, fertility, nature, festivals, prosperity, spirits and in 
general the things that make up this world, whereas Buddhism, originally a foreign 
religion which became quite Japanese over the centuries, is preoccupied with more 
sombre and reflective concerns such as death, funerals, doctrines, iconography, the 
afterlife, ancestors and meditation. In the Meiji Restoration of 1868 Shintō too was 
restored to its ancient rightful position above Buddhism and other foreign 
religions. Although the true character of Shintō was temporarily eclipsed by politics 
and ultranationalism in the 1930s and 1940s  an aberrant period about which the 
less said the better  Shintō remains fundamental to Japanese culture and is 
expressed through local and national shrine festivals, rites of purification and a love 
of nature and harmony (and so on ) 
This is, for example, the portrait of Shintō offered by the Shintō scholar-priest 
Hirai Naofusa13 in the first of three different Shintō approaches subsequently 
analysed by Breen and Teeuwen in the introduction to Shinto in History.14 It is 
the type of account vigorously promoted since the Meiji period by Shintō au-
thorities and scholars in Japan, such as those associated with the Jinja Honchō 
                                                   
12  Born Shintō Die Buddhist are used as titles for the Shintō and Buddhism chapters 
in Ian READER, Religion in Contemporary Japan (London: Macmillan, 1991). The phrase 
seems to be recent and probably dates from 1970s newspaper reports on Japanese religion 
(personal communication from Ian Reader). 
13  For example, Hirai writes in the Encyclopedia Britannica (EB) on Shintō: The term 
Shintō, in its proper historical usage, does not encompass the earliest manifestations of 
Japanese religion. It does not appear in the literature until the latter part of the 6th century 
of the Western era. In its more remote states of development Shintō as a system appears to 
have been nameless. The designation came into existence after the introduction of Bud-
dhism into Japan and was evidently created in order to distinguish the Way of Kami from 
the Way of the Buddhist Law. EB CD-ROM 1997, Shintō. 
14  BREEN and TEEUWEN, Shinto in History. 
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神社本庁 (Shrine HQ)15 and the Shintō Kokugakuin 國學院 and Kogakkan 皇學
館  universities. Hirai for example identifies three strands of Shintō: shrine 
Shintō, sect Shintō and folk Shintō, of which shrine Shintō has existed 
throughout history as a national cult and unites the other two aspects of Shintō. 
According to Hirai, the history of Shintō after its initial domination by Buddhism 
and Chinese thought fifteen hundred years ago was marked by an increasing in-
dependence of the indigenous tradition from Buddhism and Confucianism, lead-
ing eventually in the modern period to a full recovery of ancient concerns such as 
emperor veneration and the mystical power of creation.16  
A second approach to Shintō is represented by the anthropologist Hori 
Ichirō. Hori17 agrees with Hirai that there is a distinctive and continuous reli-
gious entity which can be discerned through Japanese history, but he identifies 
this more with folk religion than with Shintō (or indeed Buddhism, Taoism or 
any separate religious tradition). Characteristic of this Japanese religious entity 
is its propensity to change and develop, absorbing new influences from a variety 
of indigenous and overseas traditions. In other words, for Hori, there is a basic, 
continuing form of Japanese religiosity but it cannot be identified simply with 
what we now call Shintō, nor is it purely Japanese since it contains much that is 
universal, found in folk and popular religion elsewhere.  
A third approach is that of the historian Kuroda Toshio who in an important 
1981 article entitled Shintō in the History of Japanese Religion18 pointed out 
that the term Shintō (= Chinese shendao) meant in the past something quite 
different from the centralised system of shrine-based kami-worship and mythol-
ogy focusing on the imperial family that is meant by Shintō today. For example, 
shintō in the 8th century Nihon Shoki (Chronicle of Japan) may have meant 
either non-Buddhist popular beliefs in general or possibly Taoism. Terms usu-
ally regarded as central to Shintō such as tennō 天皇 (emperor), daiwa 大和 
(=Yamato, the centre of Japan), jingū 神宮 (the shrine of Amaterasu 天照 at Ise
伊勢) and naikū 内宮 and gekū 外宮 (the inner and outer shrines of Ise respec-
tively) were Taoist.  
Kurodas approach, which radically opposed the standard account offered 
by Hirai and others, deconstructed completely the notion of a continuous archaic 
tradition of Shintō. This, Kuroda claimed, was no more than a ghost image 
conjured up by post-Meiji Shintō apologists. Kuroda is critical even of Hori 
Ichirō for proposing any kind of continuous intuitive native religious tradition, 
                                                   
15  Jinja Honchō means Shrine HQ and to the Japanese ear has governmental connotations. 
However, the official English translation of Jinja Honchō is invariably given as Association 
of Shintō Shrines. This is an example of the way in which official Shintō appears differ-
ently inside and outside Japan. 
16  BREEN and TEEUWEN, Introduction: Shintō Past and Present, in BREEN and TEEUWEN, 
eds., Shinto in History. 
17  See HORI Ichirō, Folk Religion in Japan: Continuity and Change, ed. by Joseph KITAGAWA 
and Alan MILLER (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968). 
18  KURODA Toshio, Shintō in the History of Japanese Religion, Journal of Japanese Studies 
7.1, (1981), 1-21 (hereafter Shintō). Reprinted in MULLINS et al., eds., Religion and Soci-
ety, 7-30. 
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even if not known under the name of Shintō.19 For Kuroda, the real context 
within which changes in popular beliefs and practices including those relating to 
kami occurred was the sophisticated, self-aware and indisputably imported me-
dieval Buddhist kenmitsu 顯密  (exoteric/esoteric) tradition, developed and 
maintained principally by the Tendai and Shingon schools. Kenmitsu provided 
the theoretical basis, through ideas such as honji-suijaku 本地垂迹 (real essence-
trace manifestation) and hongaku 本覺 (innate enlightenment)20 for the deve-
lopment of both Yoshida Shintō 吉田神道 and Ise (Watarai 渡會) Shintō 伊勢神
道 teachings and practices as sectarian movements. These may be described ret-
rospectively as Shintō schools but in reality they were, on Kurodas reading, 
esoteric lineages of kenmitsu Buddhism which happened to focus on shrines. 
Such sectarian developments, located within a broadly Buddhist world-view, led 
much later to the idea that Shintō might be seen as a separate, non-Buddhist 
teaching.21 
The strength of Kurodas argument is that it dissolves the notion of a Shintō 
tradition which is both continuous and truly indigenous. Its weakness is that it 
seems unable to account for the apparent continuity of at least some aspects of 
shrine-based, kami-centred ritual activity attested to not only by kokugaku 國學 
(18th-19th century National Learning) scholars and post-Meiji Shintō national-
ists, but also by the findings of modern historical research.22 Even if many of the 
features of the Japanese religious landscape now classified as Shintō were 
originally imported, to deny them indigenous status when they have persisted 
unconscious of their origins for more than a thousand years is surely nothing but 
inverted racism. How long does it take for a cultural element which was origi-
nally Indian or Chinese to become Japanese, and what standard of indige-
nous purity would ever satisfy someone who adopts Kurodas position?  
For example, which of the following is more important? That the Ise shrines 
derive their architectural style from Chinese or Polynesian storehouses and 
therefore had foreign origins, or that the ceremonial rebuilding of the Ise 
shrines has in fact taken place at Ise about every twenty years, of course with in-
terruptions, since time immemorial? Many of Japans major shrines, like Ise, 
have existed for more than a thousand years. Or consider the idea of the ujiko-
ujigami; that a community member is a child of the kami (ujiko 氏子) of that 
communitys protective deity (ujigami 氏神). Before 1871 it had been the prac-
tice to designate only high-status or long-standing members of a community as 
ujiko of that communitys ujigami but the introduction of universal ujiko status23 
                                                   
19  KURODA, Shintō, 2. 
20  KURODA, Historical Consciousness and Hon-jaku Philosophy in the Medieval Period on 
Mount Hiei, in The Lotus Sutra in Japanese Culture, ed. by George TANABE (Honolulu: 
Hawaii University Press, 1989) (hereafter Historical Consciousness). Also KURODA, 
Shintō, 12f. 
21  KURODA, Shintō, 11ff. 
22  See e.g. Mark TEEUWENs doubts about Kurodas thesis in relation to Watarai Shintō in Wa-
tarai Shintō: An Intellectual History of the Outer Shrine in Ise (Leiden: Research School 
CNWS, 1996), 402f. 
23  HARDACRE, Shintō and State, 83, 59. The initial scheme for shrine registration (ujiko shir-
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was arguably more compatible with the character of ancient, locally-based kami-
worship than the traditional compulsory registration at Buddhist temples in-
troduced a mere two hundred years earlier to help suppress Christianity. 
Against these examples of traditions perhaps rather revived than reinvented, 
it is of course possible to bring a multitude of counter-examples lending support 
to Kurodas radical scepticism about a tradition of Shintō. A number of Japans 
most significant Shintō shrines are post-Meiji and thousands of smaller ones 
were merged (i.e. destroyed or completely changed in character) in the early 
1900s. The most blatant example of disruption of tradition is that during the 
Meiji Restoration long-established Buddhist-Shintō cultic centres, including 
great temple-shrine multiplexes such as Kasuga 春日24 were brutally separated 
by government decree from 1868 onwards in the process known as shinbutsu 
bunri 神佛分離 or the dissociation of kami and Buddhas. This cleansing of 
ancient kenmitsu-style cultic centres required a judgement to be made (some-
times by crowds of hooligans) about what was Buddhist and what was not. This 
did not mean that the elements identified and separated out as non-Buddhist 
somehow formed a ready-made and coherent system of faith and practice which 
could be dubbed Shintō. In fact the dissociation of kami and Buddhas25 is best 
seen as two separate processes. First was the subjugation (under the slogan 
haibutsu kishaku 廢佛毀釋 Destroy the Buddha! Kill Śākyamuni!) of Tokugawa 
Buddhist institutions, many of them ancient shrine-temple complexes (jisha 寺
社) and including the great yamabushi山伏 or mountain-religion centres. Sec-
ond was the initially erratic but ultimately thoroughgoing imposition of a new 
Meiji civic religious system which came to be called Shintō, whose structure 
eventually included shrines, central and local government administration, 
schools and religious sects of every kind.  
That Shintō in the sense of shrine-based ritual was radically transformed 
as a consequence of the Meiji restoration cannot be in doubt. Before the Meiji 
period there were around 170,000 shrines and temples in Japan. Most shrines 
formed part of a temple-shrine complex governed by Buddhist clergy. Even in 
and around Ise, which in theory was a Buddhism-free zone, there were three 
hundred Buddhist temples.26 Shintō ideas and practices were thoroughly inte-
grated with Buddhism. The best evidence of this is that the National Learning 
(kokugaku) movement was founded on the claim that they should not be. If by 
Shintō we now mean a tradition separate from Buddhism, then modern Shintō 
was indeed imagined and envisioned by National Learning scholars and activists 
and implemented in the Meiji period. But the new Shintō was not instantly re-
stored by kokugaku visionaries like Fukuba Bisei based in the newly-created 
                                                                                                                                                                  
abe 氏子調) was abandoned in 1873 but formal ujiko (parishioner) status remained an ele-
ment of local government up to 1945 (ibid., 29). 
24  Allan G. GRAPARD, The Protocol of the Gods: a study of the Kasuga cult in Japanese his-
tory (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), esp. chapter 5. 
25  Allan GRAPARD, Japans Ignored Cultural Revolution, History of Religions 23.3, (1984), 
240-265, esp. 240-247. 
26  HARDACRE, Shintō and State, 14. 
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Department of Divinity (and rapidly marginalised for being too backward-
looking by the Meiji oligarchy).27 In practice it was institutionalised piecemeal 
over decades, introduced opportunistically by a modernising government whose 
thinking was influenced by, but by no means controlled by National Learning 
ideas. The Meiji government used such ideas to break the power of Buddhism, as 
part of its overall programme to uproot Tokugawa feudal institutions, but the 
Shintō teachings promulgated nationwide in the early Meiji period under the 
label of Taikyō 大教 or Great Teaching were not ancient and by no means pure 
kokugaku. They were designed for a nineteenth-century nation in the process of 
creating itself in the image of the Western powers. The teachings of the Great 
Promulgation Campaign (taikyō senpu undō 大教宣布運動) of 1870-1884 in-
cluded not only loyalty and devotion to the restored emperor but also exhorta-
tions to pay taxes and import Western knowledge and culture.28 Taikyō, or 
Shintō as it became known, was not traditional kenmitsu belief, but neither was 
it the barbarian-expelling pure Shintō envisaged by the champions of National 
Learning. 
4. Shintō since 1945 
It is now over fifty years since Japans defeat in the Pacific war. That defeat led 
to a six-year occupation by a foreign, mainly American administration which 
undertook root and branch reforms of Japans religious laws. New religious leg-
islation enshrined in the post-war Constitution was aimed particularly at state 
Shintō (kokka Shintō 國家神道), understood by the occupation authorities as a 
government-sponsored quasi-religious system that, in emphasising ritual obei-
sance to the divine emperor, had fostered ultranationalism and an undemocratic 
ethic of civil obedience. The occupying forces (SCAP) first redefined Shintō as a 
religion and then wrote into the new constitution US-style clauses on separation 
of church and state and protection of religious freedom intended to prevent a 
recurrence of the pre-war alliance between Shintō and the state.  
In theory, state Shintō would be destroyed by these reforms. However, de-
spite the anxieties of Shintō authorities early in the Occupation, very little de-
struction of Shintō resources occurred. Under the terms of the 1945 Shintō Di-
rective a number of public war memorials which had attracted ultranationalist 
sentiments were removed, but these were not Shintō shrines as such.29 Devo-
tional pictures of the Emperor and copies of the Imperial Rescript on Education 
(kyōiku chokugo 教育勅語) were eliminated from the nations schools, in which 
they had been reverently enshrined since October 1890. Ultranationalist ethics 
                                                   
27  Ibid., 30-31. 
28  Ibid., 42ff. 
29  War memorials were often built in school playgrounds or similar public areas, not neces-
sarily in shrines. Some partly took the place of local shrines removed after 1906 by shrine 
merger. See SAKURAI Haruo, Tradition and Change in Local Community Shrines, Acta 
Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture (Tōhō Gakkai) 51, (1987), 62-77. 
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textbooks such as Kokutai no Hongi 國体の本義 (Cardinal Principles of the Na-
tional Entity) were also purged. However, Shintō shrines, including all signifi-
cant national and prefectural shrines built by the government since the Meiji 
restoration of 1868 to further its policy aims, remained untouched. Along with 
other religious bodies, shrines were now denied national or local government 
funding but granted the same legal status as other voluntary religious bodies un-
der the Religious Juridical Persons Law of 1951.  
The post-war reforms dismantled some of the more extreme manifestations 
of 1940s ultranationalism, an ideology which had permeated all religious groups 
including Buddhist and Christian ones, and indeed every facet of Japanese soci-
ety, mainly through the education system.30 However, seen against the backdrop 
of the profound structural changes and ideological developments which had 
transformed traditional Japanese religion in the 77 years since the Meiji Resto-
ration in 1868, it could be argued that the Occupation regimes religious reforms 
hardly scratched the surface of state Shintō. The following features survived in 
some form: 
1. The separation of Shintō and Buddhism (shinbutsu bunri) of 1868 which 
consciously dissociated Buddhism from kami beliefs and rituals. The 
separation was not reversed, though new syncretic movements developed. 
2. Development of an administrative infrastructure which incorporated all 
shrines within a national hierarchy of shrines headed by the Ise Jingū 伊
勢神宮, the ancestral shrine of the Imperial House. The governments role 
was largely taken over by Jinja Honchō which promotes the spiritual 
leadership of the Ise shrine. 
3. The extension of the status of ujiko or parishioner of both the Ise shrine 
and a local shrine to all citizens, in place of registration with a Buddhist 
temple. The sense of civic ujiko status remained, expressed in the felt obli-
gation of local parishioners to contribute to the shrines upkeep. 
4. Termination of the hereditary shrine priesthood tradition and its re-
placement by a centralised training and licensing system for Shintō 
priests. Training is (still) carried out through Jinja Honchō and the Shinto 
universities, if not through the Ministry of Education. 
5. Construction of major national and prefectural shrines including the Ya-
sukuni shrine and its associated gokoku-jinja護國神社(nation-protecting 
shrines for the war dead), the Meiji shrine and a number of branches of 
the Ise Jingū (called Kōtai Jingū 皇大神宮)31 which coupled Shintō ritual 
with ideals of military adventure, self-sacrifice and divinisation of the war 
dead. The war dead remain enshrined, and Yasukuni Shrine is a major fo-
                                                   
30  I have discussed the dissemination of state Shintō in more detail, and compared it with 
recent educational reforms in Britain, in Brian BOCKING, Fundamental Rites? Religion, 
State, Education and the Invention of Sacred Heritage in post-Christian Britain and pre-
War Japan, Religion 25, (1995), 227-247. 
31  HARDACRE, Shintō and State, 62. 
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cus for Shinto supporters including major politicians while gokoku 
shrines receive tacit official support. 
6. Extension of participation by Shintō priests in many areas of Japanese life 
including life-cycle and communal rituals previously performed by the 
household or by lay people. The expectation that Shinto priests will offici-
ate at events such as weddings and new-build ceremonies remains. 
7. The dismantling and removal by shrine merger (jinja gappei 神社合併) 
of tens of thousands of long-established local shrines on the principle of 
one village one shrine. Minor restoration of merged shrines has oc-
curred, but the shrine map of Japan remains essentially post-Meiji. 
8. The dissemination of myths of imperial legitimacy which subordinated the 
Japanese people to the demands of the kokutai (national entity of Japan) 
and the leadership of a divine emperor. This is no longer taught as history 
in schools but often identified as an ancient element of Japaneseness. 
The imperial family has not reverted to Shingon Buddhist rites. 
9. Inculcation of the view that Shintō was not a religion (hi-shūkyō 非宗教) 
but superior to religions, and that participation in Shintō rites was a mat-
ter of civic, not religious, duty. Despite the intentions of the new Constitu-
tion, the customary status of Shinto rites vis a vis religion is still ambigu-
ous even in law, as successive cases have demonstrated.32 
5.  Approaches to Shintō: Michael Pye and Helen Har-
dacre 
In the remainder of this paper I will consider two examples of approaches to the 
meanings of Shintō and make some suggestions of my own about areas which 
might usefully be explored further. The approaches are those of Michael Pye in a 
paper entitled Shintō and the Typology of Religion33 and Helen Hardacre in 
her book Shintō and the State, 1868-1988. Pyes paper is brief and theoretical 
while Hardacres work is a more detailed and well-documented thematic and 
historical account. In an ideal world, Pyes theory of Shintō would fit Hardacres 
history of modern Shintō. 
With the general aim of refining comparative categories in the study of relig-
ions, Pye sets out in his article to identify a suitable descriptor for Shintō within 
the holistic typology of religions (among terms such as primal religion, salva-
tion religion, great/little tradition etc.). His goal is a term which does not lose 
or distort the real spirit or character of Shintō.34 Pye points out that any holis-
tic consideration of Shintō must take account of three factors: firstly the diffi-
culty of defining Shintō (the nearer one comes to Shintō, the more difficult it is 
to grasp it in conceptual summary), secondly the political or national import of 
Shintō (it shares a common area with the set of values and symbols which to-
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gether make up the Japanese national feeling or identity) and finally recogni-
tion of Shintōs historical depth. By historical depth Pye means not the mere 
fact of historical longevity but rather a sense of history within Shintō which he 
dates to the time of the kokugaku (National Learning) school. In other words, 
despite Shintō appearing to have the characteristics of a primal religion, modern 
participants in Shintō have at their disposal a relatively sophisticated awareness 
of Shintō as deliberately primal in character. In Pyes words, those followers of 
Shintō who are historically sophisticated are able to enjoy the rough, archaic 
elementariness of much of the religion while fully knowing that they do so from 
a historically advanced and adjusted standpoint.  
Pye describes the quality of religious awareness in ordinary primal religion as 
follows: it is socially inclusive within a defined geographical or kinship range; it 
celebrates as worthwhile (in Shintōs case through matsuri 祭り, festivals) the 
ordinary processes of life such as conception and harvest; and it seeks to disarm 
disease and disaster by methods such as purification. In primal religion ritual 
action linked to life-processes is regular and satisfying. Pye concludes that in 
modern Japan we encounter in Shintō not primal religion but adjusted primal 
religion; that is, it embodies its own awareness of lost innocence. In the modern 
Shintō festival, says Pye, there is a realisation that the celebration of primal 
value is our present responsibility  for all its constructedness (and the con-
struct, which is also a throw-away, is a regular feature of Japanese primal relig-
ion) this adjusted primal religion has, unlike the yearnings of pan-symbolists 
and structuralists [a reference to Eliade and Lévi-Strauss], a real relationship to 
its own history.35 Shintō has therefore retained its particularism (its identity 
with Japan) and can rightly be said to form a distinct, though not necessarily 
unique, category in the typology of religions.  
Pyes account raises at least two questions to which I shall return in section 6 
below. First, what exactly does adjusted mean? Since the question of how far 
modern Shintō represents either continuity or discontinuity with Japans real 
past is a key area of controversy in Shintōs political dimension, does the notion 
of adjustment (with its suggestion of change, but only a slight change) settle the 
argument about the indigenous and native character of modern Japanese 
Shintō, or does it perhaps deflect attention from this problem? Second, whilst 
Pye is undoubtedly right to be sceptical of the relentlessly ahistorical perspective 
of Eliade, might we not still consider the possibility that a Shintō festival may be 
understood by some of its Japanese participants as a re-enactment of events in 
illo tempore, if by that phrase we mean not a return to an Eliadean primordial 
time, but rather an indigenised (Sino-Japanese) Confucian sense of the recovery 
of original purity? 
Helen Hardacres Shintō and the State, 1868-1988 is an impeccably docu-
mented account of the complex relationships between different aspects of 
Shintō and the national and local organs of the Japanese state following the 
Meiji Restoration. It is impossible to summarise the content here, but in terms of 
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approach to Shintō it is possible to identify two major perspectives. Quite evi-
dent in Hardacres discussion of contemporary issues such as the Yasukuni 
shrine question is her sympathy with democratic opposition to any resurgence of 
government-supported right-wing Shintō nationalism. She sees, but clearly does 
not celebrate, the deliberate particularism of this aspect of Shintō. In her dis-
cussion of more distant events of the Meiji period however, the approach is more 
equivocal. Central to Hardacres understanding of developments in Meiji is an 
appreciation of the impact of Western ideas of religion in key areas of policy 
development relevant to the emergence of state Shintō.  
This is a very difficult area to research and write about, because a distinctive 
feature of the early Meiji period was, as Grapard has pointed out, linguistic:  
the changes that occurred in religion in Meiji were accompanied by rather dras-
tic changes in language and [this was] not by chance.36 What I have elsewhere37 
described as a form of political correctness operated in the early Meiji period; 
traditional discourses were marginalised by a mainstream political vocabulary 
evolving rapidly (largely through the use of borrowed Western terms) to meet 
the fearsome pressures placed on Japanese government and society by exposure 
to the West. Grapard has in mind changes in the names of kami to eradicate 
their Buddhist identity, but it is also true that when Meiji bureaucrats argued 
that Shintō is not a religion, the meaning of both Shintō and religion (shūkyō 
宗教) were relatively new to Japanese debates on such issues. These terms were 
still evolving their meaning into the early 20th century.38 Shintō though a word 
hitherto rarely used, was one of the terms used for the new government-
supported, separated, emperor-based teaching which was itself involved in a 
long-drawn-out process of self-definition, partly through devices such as the 
declaration that it was non-religious (hishūkyō).39 The English word religion 
(for which translators eventually used the Buddhistic term shūkyō) normally 
meant Christianity in Meiji government documents. It came to be extended to 
Buddhism and other religious groups in the context of debates on religious free-
dom surrounding the lengthy drafting of the first (1889) Meiji constitution. The 
key point to note here, however, is that these traditions were described as relig-
ions mainly to identify them as not-Shintō. 
The evolving meaning of Shintō is for Hardacre tied up with the evolving 
meaning of religion in Japan, and she identifies this latter concept as a purely 
Western import. When ideas about religion originating in Europe and America 
came to Japan, they entered a society that had no equivalent concept or term, no 
idea of a distinct sphere of life that could be called religious, and no idea of a ge-
neric religion of which there might be local variants like Christianity, Buddhism 
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and so on.40 According to Hardacres account, the Western meaning of religion 
(which privileged doctrine, faith and religious experience) eventually super-
seded Japans heritage, in which liturgical-communal praxis was central. It was 
the Western definition of religion which Shintō administrators had in mind 
when they declared that Shintō was superior to, and not itself, religion.41  
It is not very clear to me whether Hardacres view is that the non-religious 
character of Shintō represented a continuity of pre-Meiji traditions (albeit 
stripped of Buddhist elements) or a completely new situation in which Shintō 
had acquired a new identity created in reaction to the imported notion of relig-
ion. Probably posing the question in this either-or manner does no justice to the 
subtlety of her account. But the insistence that before Meiji the Japanese had no 
conception of a generic religion suggests a break with the past in this vital area 
of the self-definition and modern self-awareness of Shintō, because the notion of 
what a religion is, is of course intimately linked with the notion of what a religion 
is not. If Hardacre is right, the allegedly legitimate sense of historical depth in 
modern Shintō, which Pye identifies as being available to the historically sophis-
ticated modern Shintōist becomes indeed a chimera; what Kuroda called a ghost 
image (and Kurodas view would surely have been endorsed by Basil Hall 
Chamberlain). Yet I find myself questioning what Hardacre says about the no-
tion of religion on a number of counts. Perhaps too much weight is being placed 
on the Western (Christian-derived) idea of religion as a determining factor in the 
evolving conceptualisation of Shintō after Meiji. I say this for four reasons. 
Firstly, Japan had been involved with Christianity before, from the sixteenth 
to the seventeenth centuries and indeed in early Meiji there were still laws di-
rected against the practice of the Christian religion. Dutch Protestants had been 
allowed to trade from Deshima after the proscription of Christianity because 
their Japanese hosts understood them to be capable of separating trade from 
religion. The Meiji period was not the first occasion for Japanese intellectuals 
and government officials to think about the problem of competing or foreign re-
ligions. 
Secondly, as Michael Pye reminds us, the writings of the 18th century Japa-
nese rationalist Tominaga Nakamoto 富永仲基 (1715-1746) embody a theory of 
religious development which shows that a sophisticated understanding of relig-
ion as generic phenomenon, manifesting in specific ways according to time and 
circumstances, could emerge quite independently in Japan by the 18th century.42 
Tominaga, whose achievements were praised by the great kokugaku scholar Mo-
toori Norinaga本居宣長 (1730-1801), no doubt represented an unusually sophis-
ticated view of the nature of religion, but it could be argued that his understand-
ing only carried forward what was implicit in the self-conscious three religions 
(sankyō / sanjiao 三教) concept imported from China early in Japans history. 
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Thirdly, the Confucian tradition embodied from its Chinese origins onwards 
a conscious sociological awareness of the function of rites for society43 which, 
while agnostic as far as the existence of the gods was concerned, regarded com-
munal religious praxis as socially beneficial. Communal rites were not merely 
tolerated by governments but were intellectually validated by the ancient Confu-
cian understanding that correctly observed religious ritual is one of the founda-
tions of the social and moral order. Sectarian developments (e.g. in Buddhism) 
were often distrusted as teachings which were legitimately religious but differed 
in character from the communal rites and therefore had to be carefully con-
trolled. Communal rites were in Confucian terms superior to sectarian religion 
(shūkyō). This distinction was not new to the Meiji period. 
Finally, I am not, as a native-speaker, convinced that the English term relig-
ion has ever had quite the generic reach Hardacre attributes to it, outside of 
modern Religious Studies of course. Perhaps the valency of the term has been 
different in America, but in my experience the term religion in the English-
speaking world has only recently acquired in ordinary speech  and then only for 
some people  a meaning which goes much beyond Christianity. There used not 
so long ago to be an academic debate, which now appears quite sterile, about 
whether Buddhism should be defined as a religion because Buddhists (it was 
said) did not believe in a supreme being. The United Kingdom, unlike Meiji Ja-
pan or the United States, does not yet have a written constitution and the mean-
ing of the term religion has never been publicly clarified. As used in the UK 1944 
Education Act it was still generally understood to mean Christianity. When re-
ligion acquired a more generic multicultural meaning in the 1970s and 1980s 
the government attempted in its educational legislation to articulate a notion of 
religion separate from Christianity, yet has seemed unable to achieve this.44  
Japanese people when questioned today do not generally identify themselves 
as belonging to a shūkyō even though they may be devout Buddhists or follow 
Shintō rites. In much the same way British people are not usually comfortable 
with the term religion, tending to prefer way of life for their own faith.45 The 
term remains, in the sense indicated by Hardacre, highly technical; part of a 
scholarly discourse rather than that of ordinary people or politicians. I am there-
fore sceptical about the degree of influence any particular interpretation of the 
English term religion exerted in the Meiji period, and I would be inclined rather 
to look to Confucian, National Learning and other indigenous Japanese notions 
(under the variety of names for religious teachings and ways available to Meiji 
thinkers46) for the basis of the world-view which, from the beginning of the Meiji 
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period and in accordance with National Learning priorities, placed Shintō 
above religion. My own preferred translation of hishukyō, the term used to de-
scribe Shintō from the 1880s onwards and usually translated non-religious, is 
non-denominational. This was the English term used to refer to the kind of 
schools’ religious education (not identifiable as any form of institutional Christi-
anity; this was explicitly prohibited) legislated for in UK state-funded schools 
from the late 19th century onwards.47 There may even be a historical connection 
between the contemporaneous terms hishūkyō and non-denominational. 
6. Nationalism, Confucianism and the meanings of 
Shintō 
I would like finally to focus attention on the role of nationalism as a force for 
radical change and Confucianism as a platform of continuity in Japanese relig-
ion, including Shintō in its various guises before and after the Meiji restoration. 
In the years since the collapse of Eastern European communism after 1989, the 
religious or quasi-religious character of modern nationalism has attracted enor-
mous scholarly interest and has been quite exhaustively investigated. The fact 
that 19th-20th century nationalism has functioned and continues to function as a 
religion of the oppressed (or of those who regard themselves as oppressed) is no 
longer in doubt. From the standpoint of an emerging nation such as Japan in the 
mid-nineteenth century it was obvious that a country that did not have its own 
strong sense of inviolable national identity, backed up by a powerful monarchy, 
army, navy and shared system of politico-religious values would very soon have 
someone elses imposed, so the requirement to build a strong nation on the 
European model and to foster nationalist sentiments among the people was ab-
solute. It is not at all surprising that modern Shintō was developed in the service 
of nationalism, though nationalism is only part of the story of modern Shintō. 
The demands of modern nationalism alone can account for much of the radical 
rejection of Japans past, including its religious past, that occurred in the Meiji 
period. 
Despite acknowledgement that Confucian thinking exerted influence in the 
creation of Meiji Shintō, there seems to be some reluctance to acknowledge its 
role as a stratum of continuity in the history and development of modern Japa-
nese religion. Perhaps this is because Confucianism is a blind spot in contem-
porary Shintō studies. Since Confucianism has no constituency in Japan, it is of 
advantage neither to rightists who favour a revival of Shintō, nor to Marxists, 
liberals and religionists who wish to attack the claim that Shintō embodies an 
unbroken indigenous Japanese tradition, to draw attention to Confucianism. In 
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the concluding part of this paper, I would like to suggest some lines of further 
enquiry into the role of Confucianism in the development of modern Shintō. 
Firstly, we should not forget that Meiji Shintō followed Tokugawa Confucian-
ism. Kurodas thesis about the late emergence of Shintō as an independent tradi-
tion focuses on medieval kenmitsu Buddhism, which assimilated miscellaneous 
local kami into the Buddhist world-view as trace-manifestations (suijaku) of the 
buddhas and bodhisattvas and thereby raised their status to that of secondary 
Buddhist divinities. Subsequently, the development of the Buddhist doctrine of 
hongaku 本覺 or innate enlightenment made possible the so-called han-honji-
suijaku 反本地垂迹 or reverse honji-suijaku theory according to which inter-
preters could claim that the kami as trace-manifestations were in fact the pri-
mary essence of enlightenment.48 However, the Meiji period in which Shintō fi-
nally emerged as a separate tradition followed on not from the heyday of Me-
dieval Buddhism but from two centuries of Tokugawa rule. Under the Tokugawa, 
Neo-Confucianism rather than esoteric Buddhism came to constitute the domi-
nant intellectual discourse. Within Neo-Confucianism the ethics of the Way (of 
the bushi 武士, of tea, etc.). spread in the towns, from the samurai to the mer-
chant classes and beyond.49 Within Japanese Confucian thought of this period 
emerged the notions of the ruler-subject relationship taking precedence over 
that of father-son; of reverence for the emperor; of Japan as the land of the 
kami, and the concept of the Way itself (the -tō in Shintō) as a transcendent 
moral or political norm.50  
Kuroda mentions the Confucian Shintō of Hayashi Razan and Yamasaki An-
sai but dismisses these as nothing more than theories of the educated class sub-
ordinating Shintōs true nature to Confucianism. Actual belief in the kami, how-
ever, as found among the common people at that time, remained subsumed un-
der Buddhism.51 Against this view it may be said that while the National Learn-
ing movement was indeed an elite intellectual movement, the Meiji oligarchy 
included Shintō administrators heavily influenced by National Learning, and 
state Shintō in the Meiji period was an ideology of the educated masses, dis-
seminated through a modern educational infrastructure. Meiji Shintō was not in 
any sense a grass-roots populist movement. This was evidenced as late as 1906-
1912 by the deep unpopularity of the shrine-merger policy. Nevertheless the 
shrine merger policy succeeded. The potential gulf between elite and popular 
religion had been bridged by mass education. Surely, therefore, we should not 
discount the power of the educated class, and hence of Confucian thought, in 
the development of modern Shintō. Marginalising the contributions of Toku-
gawa Confucian intellectuals and propagandists accentuates the discontinuity 
between Medieval Buddhism and post-Meiji Shintō, no doubt. But perhaps an 
opportunity is thereby missed to consider a layer of developing, reflexive Shintō 
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self-awareness which has contributed to the sense of historical depth. As we 
have seen above, Pye identifies this feature of Shintō as something available 
since the time of the kokugaku scholars to the historically sophisticated  that 
is, to educated people. 
Secondly, we should note that the core of Meiji Shintō teachings was Confu-
cian loyalty and filial piety. As Hardacre observes, Shintō priests  preached on 
loyalty, filial piety and the cult of tutelary deities and linked these to the attitude 
of respect for the kami. This complex of ideas, cults and attitudes was justified as 
a continuation of tradition.52 And: In the realm of ethics, most priests seemed 
to assume that they could adopt the core Confucian values of the Tokugawa era 
as the ethics of Shintō. No-one was prepared to answer the accusation that these 
values originated not in Shintō but in Confucianism. Similarly, the fact that these 
ideas were the standard fare of sermons by Buddhist priests passed without seri-
ous effort at justification by shrine priests. Nor did shrine priests draw a connec-
tion between these values and the ritual life of particular shrines. 53 Here again, 
there is evidence of continuity with the diffused Neo-Confucian spirituality of 
the Tokugawa period rather than discontinuity with pre-Meiji values. 
Thirdly, the young Emperor Meiji had a Confucian tutor, Motoda Eifu, whom 
he asked to comment on a draft of the Meiji Constitution produced in 1878 by a 
Council of Elders (genrōin 元老院) committee including Fukuba Bisei. The draft 
contained a clause guaranteeing limited freedom of religion. Motoda 
 attacked the provision for religious freedom. His preferred version stipulated that 
subjects could believe in any religion so long as it did not contravene civil and 
governmental conduct, and so long as it did not run counter to the religion of the 
state. He proposed that Confucianism be established as the states religion and that 
the emperor rule over the religion and morality of the people. Thus Motodas draft 
constitution  gave the emperor theocratic powers, advocated the unity of state and 
religion, and hence precluded the principle of religious freedom.54 
It was pressure from Motoda, too, that lay behind the promulgation of the Impe-
rial Rescript on Education in 1890. From the immediate elevation of the Impe-
rial Rescript to the status of a sacred object and the increasing emphasis on de-
votion to the emperor as a divinity in subsequent years we may see that Mo-
todas notion of an imperial theocracy was in fact substantially realised in state 
Shintō, despite the provisions for religious freedom contained in the Meiji Con-
stitution of 1889.  
Fourthly, the various National Learning enterprises themselves originated in 
a nostalgic Confucian-style concern to uncover the Japanese equivalent of the 
golden age of the Duke of Chou and Confucius. Motoori Norinaga and other ko-
kugaku scholars strove to recover the idealized mentality of the early Japa-
nese.55 The pre- and post-Meiji theme of restoration (fukko 復古) which empha-
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sised the apical role of the Emperor or his heavenly ancestor Amaterasu is proto-
typically Confucian. The notion that Japans destiny is to restore things to the 
way they should be, overtly informed the development of state Shintō up to 1945. 
Perhaps a reference to Confucian nostalgia should not be ruled out when analys-
ing the type of deliberate, reflective adjusted primal religiosity engendered in 
the modern, often urban, shrine rites and festivals on which Pye bases his inter-
pretation of Shintō. Local and particularistic though these may be, they are tak-
ing place within an East Asian cultural sphere in which the value of a return to 
origins of a Confucian, not necessarily an Eliadean, kind is culturally appreci-
ated. 
Finally, Confucian thought emphasises, as earlier mentioned, the sociologi-
cal value of rites, especially rites of respect and veneration for the ancestors. 
Within a Confucian hierarchy the highest status is attributed to those who per-
form the highest status rites, namely those for the emperor, or by extension the 
nation. Despite one strand of popular National Learning, represented by Fukuba 
Bisei, which conceived of restoration Shintō as a popular movement involving 
priests in preaching, pastoral work and communal rites of transition such as fu-
nerals, the majority of shrine priests in the Meiji period wished to be seen, pre-
sumably in imitation of the Ise priesthood or the emperor himself, as non-
pastoral ritual specialists responsible for the nations rites and creed.56 A reluc-
tance to stoop to doctrinal and pastoral matters in a local community makes per-
fect sense for a high-status agent operating within a Confucian world-view. This 
is another factor to be taken into account if the primal character of post-Meiji 
Shintō religiosity is to be equated with an emphasis on ritual as opposed to con-
ceptualisation, particularly since Shintō priests remain as ritualists somewhat 
aloof, as Pye observes, from the rest of the participants in a matsuri.57  
In conclusion, we might hazard that Shintō in both the pre- and post-Meiji pe-
riods has a rather more Confucian meaning than todays accounts seem willing 
to recognise. It may also be that a greater emphasis on continuity with Confucian 
ideas of the Tokugawa period would help to mediate the polarisation between 
pro-Shintō and anti-Shintō approaches which we find in modern Shintō studies. 
Finally, an appreciation of some of the Confucian (and to that extent wider East 
Asian) features of contemporary shrine Shintō might throw further light on the 
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